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Abstract: One Stoic response to the skeptical indistinguishability argument is
that it fails to account for expertise: the Stoics allow that while two similar
objects create indistinguishable appearances in the amateur, this is not true of
the expert, whose appearances succeed in discriminating the pair. This paper re-
examines the motivations for this Stoic response, and argues that it reveals the
Stoic claim that, in generating a kataleptic appearance, the perceiver’s mind is
active, insofar as it applies concepts matching the perceptual stimulus. I argue
that this claim is reflected in the Stoic definition of the kataleptic appearance,
and that it respects their more general account of mental representation. I
further suggest that, in attributing some activity to the mind in creating each
kataleptic appearance, and in claiming that the expert’s mind allows her to form
more kataleptic appearances than the amateur, the Stoics draw inspiration from
the wax tablet model in Plato’s Theaetetus (190e–196d), where Socrates distin-
guishes the wise from the ignorant on the basis of how well they match sensory
input with its appropriate mental ‘seal’ (σφραγίς).
Keywords: Stoic, cognitive impression, Theaetetus, wax tablet, ancient
skepticism
Introduction
According to the ancient Stoics, the human mind has access to a reliable means of
obtaining information about our surroundings and learning what the world is like.
Because of their direct link with reality, some appearances we form are kataleptic
(καταληπτική).1 This label reflects the Stoic claim that in giving our assent to such
appearances and endorsing their content, we achieve the accurate mental grasp
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College, Oxford, UK, E-mail: simon.shogry@philosophy.ox.ac.uk
1 In transliterating, rather than translating, καταληπτική I follow Hankinson (2003, n. 1), Striker
(1996, 51), and Brittain (2014).
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that is κατάληψις.2 Whatever the kataleptic appearance says about the world is
guaranteed to match the way it is, and for this reason these appearances are held
to function as criteria of truth (DL vii 54).
From its initial formulation by the Stoic founder Zeno, the doctrine of the
kataleptic appearance provoked a centuries-long debate with first Academic and
then Pyrrhonian skeptics. To their minds, the Stoic attempt to develop and
defend this position is futile, ‘more a prayer than the truth’ (SE M vii 402).
Contrary to what the Stoics claim, the skeptics argue that no appearance is
guaranteed to put the perceiver in touch with the way the world is, because for
any appearance that is putatively kataleptic, there is a false appearance indis-
tinguishable from it.
This ‘indistinguishability’ (ἀπαραλλαξία) argument forms part of a larger
skeptical strategy to dislodge the kataleptic appearance as a criterion of truth.
In this paper, I focus on one application of the indistinguishability argument, to
the case where a perceiver encounters a pair of highly similar objects such as
twins, eggs, or snakes (SE M vii 408–410; Cicero Acad. ii 54–57, 84–87). The
skeptical claim here is that any appearance the subject forms of one egg, for
instance, could have been created from an encounter with another egg that is
highly similar to it but numerically distinct. Thus neither of these appearances
will be kataleptic, since each could have come from what is not the case –
namely the state of affairs containing the other member of the pair.
The Stoics respond to this challenge with what we can call the appeal to
expertise. It is only the amateur perceiver, they claim – someone who lacks
expertise concerning the objects in question – who forms appearances which fail
to distinguish one member of the highly similar pair from the other. But when
the expert turns her gaze to these same objects, the appearances she forms will
succeed in discriminating the minute differences between them. There are some
farmers on Delos, we are told, who really can perceptually distinguish one egg
from another (Cicero, Acad. ii 57–58). These farmers’ expert appearances, unlike
those created by the amateur, are then held to be kataleptic, because they could
2 Translating κατάληψις as ‘cognition’ is potentially misleading, since it is possible to have
cases of false cognition but not false κατάληψις. ‘Apprehension’ – another popular translation –
carries unhelpful emotional connotations. Some commentators have compared Stoic κατάληψις,
the outcome of assenting to a kataleptic appearance (SE M vii 151; Alex. Aphr. DA 71.10–13) with
our contemporary notion of knowledge: see Perin (2005, n. 1), Annas (1990, 187), and Long and
Sedley (1987, 157); cf. also Nawar (2014, n. 1) and Menn (1995, 9–10). This intriguing proposal is
developed and defended in Schwab (ms). Note that the Stoics posit a superior epistemological
state – ἐπιστήμη – that is more secure than κατάληψις by being ‘unshakeable by argument’
(Arius in Stob. Ecl. ii 73.18–20 and 112.13). However, present purposes do not require any further
treatment of ἐπιστήμη and its relationship to κατάληψις.
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not have arisen from a false state of affairs. According to the Stoics, then, the
skeptics exaggerate the extent to which highly similar objects produce indistin-
guishable appearances: the challenge fails to attend to the presence of expertise
in the perceiver.
This paper takes a new look at the presuppositions behind this exchange,
whose significance for our understanding of Stoic epistemology has yet to be
appreciated. According to my reconstruction, the appeal to expertise brings to
light the Stoic claim that to generate a kataleptic appearance always involves the
activity of the perceiver’s mind – an exercise of reason which organizes and
articulates the deliverances of the sense-organs on the basis of the concepts the
perceiver possesses. I will then suggest that the activity of the mind in forming
each kataleptic appearance is registered in the Stoics’ canonical definition of the
kataleptic appearance, which requires, in its second clause, that such appear-
ances are ‘sealed… on the basis of what indeed is the case’ (καὶ κατ’ αὐτὸ τὸ
ὑπάρχον… ἐναπεσφραγισμένη: SE M vii 248). My proposal is to cash out this part
of the second clause with the claim that, if an appearance is kataleptic, then it
has been generated under the influence of the concepts appropriate for the
object, those which distinguish it from others in the context. One upshot will
be an improved understanding of why the Stoics make the appeal to expertise:
because the expert’s mind is more advanced and her conceptual repertoire more
expansive than the amateur’s, there will be some circumstances in which a
kataleptic appearance is available only to her.
Now, although it is recognized by scholars in other contexts, the Stoic
commitment to the mind’s activation of concepts is totally absent from recent
treatments of the kataleptic appearance, even from those which take notice of
the appeal to expertise. I suspect that one reason for this omission is that the
language of ‘sealing’, which features prominently in the canonical definition, is
thought to entail that, in forming a perceptual kataleptic appearance, the mind
is entirely passive, serving only as a surface onto which features of the object are
accurately stamped or imprinted.3 However, once we recall the original context
of this imagery in Plato’s Theaetetus (190e–196d) – a text the early Stoics studied
carefully – we will see that comparing the perceiver’s mind to a wax tablet does
not rule out its activity, specifically that of categorizing the perceptual stimulus
by engaging a representation stored in memory. Indeed, Socrates distinguishes
the wise from the ignorant in this passage on the basis of how well each matches
sensory input with its correct mental ‘seal’ (σφραγίς: 192a6, 194c8–d7). In a
3 See Long (2002, 228): the second clause of the canonical definition ‘requires a qualifying impres-
sion to have the imprint or stamp of its source object’.
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departure from recent scholarly treatments, I argue that the Stoics appropriate
this Platonic insight to expound their own claim that the mind, in generating a
kataleptic appearance, applies the concepts appropriate for the object, and,
moreover, that the expert will do this better than the amateur.4 As we will see,
the later Stoic Epictetus repeatedly characterizes correct concept application as a
component of epistemological success, and there is ample evidence to think he
is echoing early Stoic thinking on this point. Tracing this Stoic account back to
the Theaetetus promises to shed much needed light on the appeal to expertise,
and also to improve our understanding of how the central innovation of Stoic
epistemology – the doctrine of the kataleptic appearance (cf. Eusebius, Pr. Ev.
14.6.12–13; Cicero, Acad. i 40–41) – takes shape in response to this Platonic
text.5
Before considering these points, however, I begin with the Stoic account of
the ‘appearance’ (φαντασία) – the more general psychological activity of which
the kataleptic appearance (φαντασία καταληπτική) is one type (DL vii 49; SE M
viii 398) – with a view to clarifying the role of the mind in generating each
appearance (§2). With this background material in place, I turn to the canonical
definition of the kataleptic appearance and present its standard interpretation
(§3). Next I will propose my new reading of the definition and argue that it
respects the Stoics’ more general theoretical commitments and makes better
sense of the appeal to expertise (§4–6). I will conclude by showing that, on
my reconstruction of their epistemological theory, the Stoics remain faithful to
the original presentation of the wax tablet in the Theaetetus and so owe a deeper
debt to this dialogue than has hitherto been recognized (§7).
4 Here I mean to challenge the assessment in Long (2002, 228): ‘Unlike the Wax Tablet, Zeno’s
KP [katalêptikê phantasia] does not rest on presumptions about the correspondence between a
present percept and a pre-existing, cognitively accurate memory stamp of the same empirical
object’. Both Ioppolo (1990, 438–439) and Togni (2013, 168–171), share Long’s assessment.
5 Long (2002) successfully discerns the outlines of the Stoic doctrine of the kataleptic appear-
ance in the Theaetetus, both in the wax tablet model of false judgment (δόξα) (190e–196d) and
also in the later discussion of the distinguishing mark that must be added to a true judgment to
upgrade it to ἐπιστήμη (208c–209c). However, as the notes above make clear, Long’s interpre-
tation does not give proper due to the role of the perceiver’s mind in creating a kataleptic
appearance, specifically in activating the concepts appropriate for the sense-object, and Long
explicitly denies that the ancestor of this Stoic commitment can be found in Socrates’s dis-
cussion of the wax tablet (2002, 228). My goal is to substantiate a deeper pattern of Platonic
influence upon Stoic epistemology than Long’s earlier study acknowledges. (It is likely that
Socrates’s discussion of the Aviary [196d–200d] also floats proposals of interest to the Stoics,
but I do not examine the parallels here.)
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Appearances and the Rational Mind
Let’s begin, then, with a basic sketch of the appearance (φαντασία) and its role
within Stoic theory.6 Here and for the rest of the paper, I will focus exclusively
on perceptual appearances created by rational (i. e. adult human) agents (cf. DL
vii 51). After all, it is these appearances which take center-stage in the skeptical
challenge from highly-similar objects, and whose kataleptic status the Stoics
endeavor to defend.7
The Stoics propound their account of the appearance in the context of a
psychological model on which external objects interact with the soul and
produce changes in it (Chrysippus in Aëtius, SVF ii 54). As corporealists, the
Stoics identify the soul as a kind of breath (πνεῦμα), a mixture of fire and air
suffusing the entirety of the subject’s body (Calcidius, Tim. 220; Iamblichus in
Stob. Ecl. i 368.12–20). The ‘ruling’ part of the soul (ἡγεμονικόν) – also called the
‘mind’ or ‘intellect’ (διανοία) – is found in the subject’s chest (Chrysippus, in
Galen, PHP iii 1.10–15; cf. DL vii 55, 110, 159), whereas the perceptual soul-parts
animate the sense-organs. Connected to the mind like the ‘tentacles of an
octopus’ (Aëtius, SVF ii 836), these perceptual soul-parts transmit the changes
taken on as a result of the perceiver encountering an external object (DL vii 52).
6 Though the basic sketch is widely accepted (see notes below), it is rejected by Reed (2002,
161–167) and more recently by Caston (forthcoming, 18–26). Caston’s novel account raises a
number of important issues but unfortunately falters in mistaking sayables that are true of a
psychological subject with content generated by, and available to, that subject.
7 See Nawar (2014, 5–10) for a helpful survey of recent debate over the possibility of
appearances that are both kataleptic and non-perceptual. The Stoics seem to assume there
are such appearances e. g. in Chrysippus’s discussion of the Sorites, where the non-perceptual
appearance that <<Fifty is few>> is described as kataleptic (SE M vii 416–421; PH ii 253; Cicero,
Acad. ii 92–94). But whatever we think of this case, my focus in this paper is on the challenge
raised for adult human agents by the alleged perceptual indistinguishability of two highly
similar objects (cf. Perin 2005, 383; Hankinson 2003, 71; Striker 1996, 52). I cannot pursue here
the interesting question of whether the Sage has a single unified strategy for limiting his
assent to kataleptic appearances of all kinds, whether perceptual or not (cf. DL vii 45–47;
Cicero, Acad. ii 53): but see Shogry (2018, 368–380) and Perin (2005, 396–399). The status in
Stoic epistemology of kataleptic appearances that are non-rational, i. e. kataleptic appearan-
ces created by non-rational minds (those of non-human animals and children before becom-
ing rational adults) is much less clear: see Frede (1999, 315) for preliminary remarks on the
topic. Cf. also Hierocles, Eth. St col. vii-viii. In any case, I fully endorse the observation in
Klein (2016, 174) that non-rational kataleptic appearances ‘do not satisfy the formal set of
conditions associated with kataleptic impressions’, and so will not be covered by the canon-
ical definition discussed below. I thus set aside all further treatment of them here and focus
exclusively on the kataleptic status of appearances that are both rational and perceptual.
The Stoic Appeal to Expertise 5
Brought to you by | University of Oxford - Bodleian Libraries
Authenticated
Download Date | 8/29/19 1:50 PM
It is important to note, however, that to form a perceptual appearance
involves more than just a change in the sense-organs. On the Stoic view, a
perceptual appearance is always created in the subject’s mind, which actively
responds to what is conveyed to it by the sense-organs and perceptual soul-parts
(SE M vii 232–233). Why might the Stoics insist on a distinction between changes
to the sense-organs and changes to the mind, explicitly classifying the percep-
tual appearance as a case of the latter?
One plausible answer scholars have offered lies in the Stoic account of
representation.8 According to the Stoics, the appearance ‘shows itself and also
what made it’ (Chrysippus in Aëtius, SVF ii 54). Minimally, this remark indicates
that, upon encountering an object in one’s surroundings, e. g. a white table, the
perceptual appearance is the psychological state that brings the white table into
one’s awareness. In other words, the perceptual appearance serves to represent
the white table, in the sense that it conveys to the perceiver that this object is in
her environment. The Stoics seem to think that, in order to play this representa-
tional role, the perceptual appearance requires more cognitive sophistication
than the sense-organs can provide on their own.9
We can appreciate the justification for this claim by consulting Stoic discus-
sions of the appearances of interest to the present study, those created in the
minds of perceivers who possess reason. For the Stoics, this will mean all
normally-developed adult humans (Aëtius, SVF ii 83; cf. Iamblichus, SVF i 149).
These ‘rational’ perceptual appearances, as the Stoics call them (λογικαί: DL vii
51), represent the world using the resources of reason. More specifically, the Stoics
hold that they are formed under the influence of the perceiver’s concepts
(ἔννοιαι).10 In creating a rational perceptual appearance, the mind engages the
8 See, e. g. Long and Sedley (1987, 239–240) and Frede (1983, 153–155).
9 Throughout the paper I translate φαντασία as ‘appearance’ rather than ‘impression’ to
emphasize that φαντασία is distinct from the changes in the sense-organs which precede it.
My translation also facilitates easier discussion of the metaphors of ‘imprinting’ and ‘sealing’
which feature in the canonical definition of the kataleptic appearance (§3–4 below).
10 On this point I am in agreement withmany recent commentators (Frede 1983, 153–155; Long and
Sedley 1987, 240; Frede 1994, 57; Brittain 2002, 256–259, 2006, n. 25; Togni 2013, 173; Brittain 2014,
n. 8; Coope 2016, n. 27; and DeHarven 2018, 221–8). Indeed, for Chrysippus, to possess reason just is
to possess ‘a collection of certain concepts and primary notions’ (Galen, PHP v 3.1). Here Chrysippus
refers to the concepts that are created in the course of our natural development (‘primary notions’,
προλήψεις) as well as those created through special training (Aëtius, SVF ii 83). Given this
identification, and also the choice to label the appearances of adult humans as ‘rational’, it
seems plausible to interpret the rational appearance as somehow involving these reason-constitut-
ing concepts.
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concepts it has built up over time to categorize and articulate the external object
that has altered the relevant sense-organ(s) (Galen, PHP ii 5.12–13; cf. Plutarch,
Soll. 961c).11 Suppose again the perceiver encounters a white table. This object
creates a change in the perceiver’s eyes, a change which is then transmitted to the
mind, which activates the TABLE and WHITE concepts stored in memory: the result
is the perceptual appearance that <<Here is a white table>>, the modification to
the mind that brings the white table into the perceiver’s awareness.12 So according
to the Stoics, to form a perceptual appearance counts as an exercise of reason
because it requires the activation of the subject’s stored concepts.
In offering this account, the Stoics assume that concepts convey information
of a generic or universal character. For instance, Cicero reports that the sayable
<<if it is human, then it is a mortal animal participating in reason>> gives the
content of the concept HUMAN (Acad. ii 21).13 This remark suggests that the
content of a concept specifies the features that objects answering to that concept
typically display (e. g. of humans, mortality and rationality). And so in possess-
ing this concept, the perceiver has the information needed to detect human
beings when she encounters them in her surroundings.14 Upon receiving per-
ceptual input from the sense-organs, the rational mind generates an appearance
by ascertaining that these inputs instantiate the characteristics laid out in the
content of one or more of its stored concepts. But there is no reason to think that
this determination by the mind is necessarily a conscious process which the
subject performs deliberately: rather, what the Stoics insist on is that it is
11 See further discussion of these texts in Brittain (2005, 170–171). Note that the Stoics charac-
terize each rational appearance, including those which are perceptual, as a ‘thought’ (νόησις:
DL vii 51). Some evidence for the Stoic assumption that thought requires the possession and use
of concepts can be gleaned from SE PH ii 1–12 and its sister passage M viii 337–336a. Here, in
responding to the charge that the Pyrrhonist cannot consistently undertake investigation,
Sextus concedes to his dogmatic critics that both investigating and thinking about x requires
consulting the concept of x (M viii 331a–332a). Given the Stoic jargon in the immediate context
(M viii 334a) and also in the parallel passage (PH ii 1–12), it is likely that such dogmatic critics
include the Stoics. For further discussion of these texts and their relevance for Stoic accounts of
thought, see Vogt (2012, 147–156) and Brunschwig (1994, 224–228).
12 I use SMALL CAPITALS to denote concepts. The phrase inside of guillemets (<<here is a white
table>>) picks out the sayable (λεκτόν) – in this case an assertible (ἀξίωμα) – that specifies the
linguistically-structured form of the content of the appearance (SE M viii 70; DL vii 63, 66–68).
The truth-evaluability of a rational appearance derives from that of its corresponding assertible: a
rational appearance is true if and only if its content-assertible is true; false if and only if its
content-assertible is false: see Inwood (1985, 56–57); Shields (1993, 336); and Vogt (2012, 171–175).
13 Si homo est, animal est mortale rationis particeps. Here I follow Brittain (2005, 174 n. 40). Cf.
SE M xi 8–9.
14 See also Crivelli (2010, 378–379).
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automatic, occurring whenever we form a perceptual appearance in virtue of our
status as rational creatures.
We can therefore discern both a passive and active aspect in the generation
of each perceptual appearance. On the one hand, to create a perceptual appear-
ance requires the sense-organs to be altered by the perceiver’s interaction with a
sense-object, an alteration that is transmitted to the mind, where it makes an
impact. But to articulate the cognitive significance of this impact – to bring the
object into the perceiver’s awareness, and to represent what it is like – some
psychological activity is required. The mind must respond to the affections of the
sense-organs by activating certain concepts and predicating them of the sense-
object encountered.15 Only when both the passive and active elements are in
place will the Stoics say that a perceptual appearance has been created.16 So
even in receiving the simplest sensory representations of our surroundings, the
perceiver’s mind is active.
The Kataleptic Appearance
Given the mind’s active role in creating our perceptual appearances, how should
we understand the Stoic claim that some of these appearances will be kataleptic
as well? What implications does the rationality of our appearances have on the
Stoic account of which appearances are guaranteed to be true? And how, if at
all, is this commitment reflected in the canonical definition of the kataleptic
appearance? So far as I can tell, no commentator has explicitly raised these
15 It is tempting to think that the Stoics would explain the truth-evaluability of a rational
appearance on the grounds that truth-evaluability requires predication, and that to form a
rational appearance involves predicating concepts to objects.
16 This crucial point is missed by Stojanović (2019, 164–6). Note that at least for the Stoics
following Chrysippus (cf. DL vii 50; SE M vii 228–229, 372–373), the appearance is never
described as an entirely passive change in the mind: the Stoics’ language seems to be deliber-
ately hedged on this point. As Sextus reports the general Stoic position, the appearance is an
alteration created ‘on the basis of an effect’ (κατὰ πεῖσιν), or ‘a quasi-effect… i. e. a disposition’
(πεῖσίς τις… καὶ διάθεσις) (SE M vii 237–240). Here the Stoics concede that the appearance is
more passive than the mind’s creation of impulses and acts of assent. But this reflects the idea
that the generation of the perceptual appearance involves an encounter with a sense-object,
whereas this is never the case for impulse and assent: these two psychological activities
transpire entirely within the subject’s soul (cf. Seneca, Ep. 113.23; Aulus Gellius, Att. Noct.
19.1). I agree with Ioppolo (1990, 435), that the appearance ‘is active because it implies an
operation of the mind’ and ‘cannot be reduced to a mere affection’ but is still ‘passive in its
relationship with assent’. See also Bobzien (1998, 240) and Brittain (2014, 334).
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questions, but, unless an answer is forthcoming, a full understanding of Stoic
epistemology and of the structure of the Stoic-skeptic debate will elude us.
Let’s consider the canonical definition. To distinguish which appearances
are kataleptic and which are not, the Stoics eventually settled on a three-
pronged account, on which the kataleptic appearance:
(i) ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος (‘comes from what is the case’)
(ii) καὶ κατ’ αὐτὸ τὸ ὑπάρχον ἐναπομεμαγμένη καὶ ἐναπεσφραγισμένη (‘and
has been imprinted and sealed on the basis of what indeed is the case’)
(iii) ὁποία οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο ἀπὸ μὴ ὑπάρχοντος (‘of such a sort that it could not
have come from what is not the case’.) (SE M vii 248)17
According to one scholarly interpretation, standard but not entirely uncontro-
versial, clause (i) secures the kataleptic appearance’s truth. What the kataleptic
appearance says about the world matches the way it really is, and thus ‘comes
from what is the case’.18
Clause (ii) on the standard interpretation indicates that not every true
appearance is kataleptic: in addition, it must be ‘imprinted and sealed on the
basis of what indeed is the case’. The wording here – which we will consider in
more detail below – is commonly taken to refer to the representational character
17 See also SE M vii 402; PH ii 4; and DL vii 50. At DL vii 46 and SE M xi 183 we find a shorter
definition, with versions only of the first two clauses. Cicero Acad. ii 77 and SE M vii 252 suggest
that the third clause was added after Arcesilaus’s initial criticism of the doctrine. I discuss why
the Stoics might have seen the need for this addition below.
18 Thus Frede (1983, 164–165); Annas (1990, 190–191); Frede (1999, 302–304); Brennan (2005,
67); Brittain (2006, xx); Løkke (2015, 68). Sedley (2002, 146–147) agrees that clause (i) requires
truth, but on the basis of a controversial reading of ἀπὸ: see discussion in Nawar (2014, 4–5),
and Stojanović (2019, 156–159). ‘What is the case’ is my translation of τὸ ὕπαρχον, to reflect that
the Stoics are here picking out a true sayable – the content of the kataleptic appearance – which
we know from other sources ὑπάρχει rather than ὑφίσταται: see Stobaeus, Ecl. i 106 and SE M
viii 10. A weaker existential reading, on which τὸ ὑπάρχον refers not to a true state of affairs but
rather to any existing object, would overlook this attested technical Stoic usage. It is also
notable that at Acad. ii 57 and 112, and Fin. v 76, Cicero translates instances of ὑπάρχον in the
canonical definition veridically not existentially (as does Augustine, Contra Academicos iii
18.26–28). A pair of recent studies, Stojanović (2019, 160–169) and Caston (forthcoming,
12–18), rejects these considerations and argues instead that τὸ ὕπαρχον should be rendered
as ‘what is present’. I cannot discuss in detail here the interesting arguments that Caston and
Stojanović adduce in support of their construal. But prima facie their proposal has the implau-
sible consequence that there can be no kataleptic appearance of the validity of a proof or of the
endpoints of a sorites (cf. Cicero, Acad. ii 92–94 and n. 7 above), since these facts cannot be
present in the relevant sense.
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and causal history of the kataleptic appearance.19 In being ‘imprinted and
sealed’, the mind has been affected by the object of a perceptual kataleptic
appearance in a particularly direct manner, with the result that it forms a
maximally detailed depiction of that object. Because of the non-defective con-
ditions under which it is perceived, the object of a kataleptic appearance leaves
behind in the mind an accurate outline of itself. By contrast, in a non-kataleptic
appearance, the circumstances are such that the object fails to make a fully
determinate trace upon the mind, resulting in an appearance that is hazy or
blurry (cf. SE M vii 258). The kataleptic appearance is thus held to be ‘of such a
sort that it could not have come from what is not the case’ (clause (iii)) because
nothing other than what the kataleptic appearance represents (‘what is the
case’) could have made the same kind of unmediated and direct effect on the
mind. So interpreted, the three clauses entail that no false appearance could
display the kind of clarity found in a kataleptic appearance. But at no point is
the mechanism of concept application invoked.
The standard interpretation admittedly has many virtues, most of all that it
carves out a subset of appearances – those which are true and created in such a
way as to represent their objects clearly and distinctly, unlike any false appear-
ance – that could plausibly ground κατάληψις. If there really are appearances of
this kind, they would be the ones to nominate as criteria of truth. Furthermore,
the standard interpretation can explain why the early Stoics came to expand the
definition to include clause (iii), as a way of clarifying that the features picked
out in clauses (i) and (ii) will not hold of any false appearance (SE M vii 252;
Cicero Acad. ii 77).20
I will argue, however, that the standard interpretation provides an incom-
plete account of the canonical definition and fails to render important nuances
in the Stoic position. First of all, it ignores a point I have emphasized in the
preceding section, that the Stoics attribute some activity to the mind in the
generation of our appearances and in the way they represent their objects.
Since the Stoics hold that concepts are activated in the generation of every
rational appearance, we would also expect them to play a role in the formation
19 Frede (1999, 306), Brennan (2005, 67–68), Brittain (2006, xx-xxi), Nawar (2014, 5), and
Caston (forthcoming, 12–13). Sedley (2002, 147–148), and Stojanović (2019, 171) hold that clause
(ii) refers to the high-quality representational character of the kataleptic appearance but not its
causal history.
20 Thus I agree with Frede (1983, 163–166) and Frede (1999, 308) that the final clause does not
introduce a new feature beyond those referred to in clauses (i) and (ii). Sedley (2002, 148–149)
and Annas (1990, 195) offer an alternative view.
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of our kataleptic appearances, given that these too are a kind of rational
appearance (DL vii 46; SE M viii 398).
Second, in neglecting this aspect of Stoic theory, the standard interpretation
likewise obscures an argumentative strategy that the Stoics use to defend the
possibility of κατάληψις against skeptical attack: the appeal to expertise. Of certain
objects and their features, only the mind of the expert is apt to form a kataleptic
appearance, and in these circumstances the Stoics will recommend that any non-
expert suspend assent (Cicero,Acad. ii 57). The appeal to expertise allows the Stoics
to respond to a recurring brand of skeptical counter-argument, yet, as I will show in
more detail below, the standard interpretation struggles to explain this anti-skep-
tical strategy and the broader dialectical context in which it emerges.21
Ultimately, I believe that these two shortcomings in the standard interpre-
tation originate in a misunderstanding of the language of sealing and imprinting
in clause (ii), wrongly construing them as indicating only a passive effect made
on the mind by the object of the kataleptic appearance. As mentioned above, the
participles ‘sealed’ (ἐναπεσφραγισμένη) and ‘imprinted’ (ἐναπομεμαγμένη) are
commonly held to indicate that the object of the kataleptic appearance has
affected the mind directly, with the result that the object is depicted clearly
and distinctly.22 On this construal, the kataleptic appearance is ‘sealed’ and
‘imprinted’ insofar as the mind where it is generated is passively affected by an
object so as to capture its relevant features. But this interpretation sits uncom-
fortably with the Stoic claim that the mind is active in the generation of every
rational appearance, and commentators have largely failed to apply the Stoics’
more general account of representation to the specific case of the kataleptic
appearance. To substantiate this line of criticism, and fill in the gaps in the
standard interpretation, it is now time to re-assess the second clause and clarify
the significance of the wax tablet imagery it deploys.23
21 Cf. Annas (1990, 199): the invocation of expertise at Cicero, Acad. ii 57–58 ‘is a strange claim
for the Stoics to make. Why ever would they appeal to an alleged actual poultry farmer on Delos
who could tell eggs apart?’
22 See Long (2002, 228) quoted above. Cf. also Nawar (2014, 5–6): ‘the talk of “stamping” and
“impressing” [in clause (ii)] also suggests that the appearance has to be caused in the right way.
This is because something leaving an impression or imprint seems to be an instance of
causation par excellence. What causes a footprint? A foot.’ One exception is Frede (1999,
306–307), who acknowledges the activity of the mind in generating a kataleptic appearance
but does not offer a reconstruction of clause (ii) that invokes concept application, as I do below.
In any event, I take my contribution here to be a deepening or enriching of the standard
interpretation, not a full-scale rejection.
23 There is no indication in our sources that Chrysippus’s disagreement with Cleanthes over the
meaning of wax tablet metaphors (e. g. at DL vii 50) extends to their use in the canonical
definition. Indeed, Chrysippus seems to have accepted the canonical definition without
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A New Interpretation of Clause (ii)
Consider again the canonical definition in full. The kataleptic appearance:
(i) ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος (‘comes from what is the case’)
(ii) καὶ κατ’ αὐτὸ τὸ ὑπάρχον ἐναπομεμαγμένη καὶ ἐναπεσφραγισμένη (‘and
has been imprinted and sealed on the basis of what indeed is the case’)
(iii) ὁποία οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο ἀπὸ μὴ ὑπάρχοντος (‘of such a sort that it could not
have come from what is not the case’).
I agree with the standard interpretation that clause (i) secures truth. I also agree
with the standard interpretation that clause (ii) requires the kataleptic appear-
ance to arise in such a way that it represents its object clearly and distinctly.
Finally, I agree that, when (i) and (ii) are satisfied, the kataleptic appearance is
thought to have a direct and unmediated connection with its object – a link or
bond with the world that is missing in any false appearance (clause (iii)).
Noting these points of agreement, I aim to enhance the standard interpre-
tation by arguing for a new understanding of the two participles in clause (ii):
‘imprinted’ (ἐναπομεμαγμένη) and ‘sealed’ (ἐναπεσφραγισμένη). My strategy will
be to propose a distinct meaning for each, in contrast with the nearly-universal
approach of lumping them together as a single unit.24 And, with a view to
remedying the shortcomings of the standard interpretation, my proposal will
deploy the Stoics’ more general theory of representation to explain why clause
(ii) ensures the high-quality depiction of the object of a perceptual kataleptic
appearance.
I suggest, then, that in being ‘imprinted… on the basis of what indeed is the
case’, the Stoics indicate that the object of the kataleptic appearance has made the
appropriate kind of impact on the mind – in the case of perceptual kataleptic
appearances, an impact on the mind transmitted there by the sense-organs.25 The
qualification and to have exerted himself in defending it against skeptical attack (cf. Cicero,
Acad. ii 87; Lucian, Vit. Auct. 21). Thus the use of wax tablet imagery, insofar as it appears in the
canonical definition, is uncontroversial within the Stoa. On this point, I agree with Caston
(forthcoming, 10).
24 Brennan (2005, 67–68) and Løkke (2015, 69–70) also recognize a distinction in sense
between the two participles, but do not claim, as I do below, that ‘sealing’ refers to correct
concept application.
25 Is there any analogous ‘impact’ on the mind in the case of non-perceptual kataleptic
appearances? I don’t see why not, given Chrysippus’s generous understanding of the kind of
alteration of the soul that is the appearance: see SE M vii 227–231, viii 409–410, and insightful
discussion in Brennan (2005, 78–79). Thus even in forming a kataleptic appearance like <<This
geometrical proof is valid>>, there would be a physical change or ‘impact’ in the mind.
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kataleptic appearance is ‘imprinted’, on my reading, in that the mind where it is
formed has received an impact from its object and no other: thus the mind has
been affected ‘on the basis of what indeed is the case’ (κατ’ αὐτὸ τὸ ὑπάρχον).
On my view, then, the standard interpretation as stated above does not mis-
describe the significance of the ‘imprinting’ discussed in clause (ii). Here the Stoics
really domean to pick out the passive aspect of the kataleptic appearance, the effect
on themind caused by its object. But the standard interpretation is inadequate as an
account of the entire clause, which contains in addition a second participle: the
kataleptic appearance must also be ‘sealed (ἐναπεσφραγισμένη) on the basis of
what indeed is the case (κατ’ αὐτὸ τὸ ὑπάρχον)’.
I contend that, with this phrase, the Stoics mean to express that, in gen-
erating a kataleptic appearance, the mind must activate the concepts that
correctly articulate the impact made upon it. The second participle thus has
on my preferred construal the sense of ‘certified with a seal’ or ‘affixed with a
mark’: it serves to pick out the mind’s activity of affixing concepts, the active
aspect of the generation of an appearance. Every rational appearance will be
‘sealed’ in this sense, since, according to Stoic theory, to generate such an
appearance always involves the activation of concepts stored in the perceiver’s
memory.26 What distinguishes the kataleptic appearance, then, is that it is
‘sealed on the basis of what indeed is the case’ (κατ’ αὐτὸ τὸ ὑπάρχον): in a
kataleptic appearance the mind applies the ‘seals’ (concepts) that correctly
match its object.27 The concepts activated in a kataleptic appearance appropri-
ately characterize the true state of affairs it represents.28
26 Cf. SE M viii 334a, where Sextus distinguishes consulting the stored concept of x from
achieving κατάληψις of x, and endeavors to show that the Pyrrhonist does the former but not
the latter. Whether or not his argument is successful, the distinction Sextus draws is consistent
with Stoic epistemology: see further discussion in Vogt (2012, 147–152).
27 DL vii 50 reports a version of clause (ii) that includes a third participle (‘molded’,
ἐναποτετυπωμένη) occurring in between the two discussed here (‘imprinted’ and ‘sealed’). Cf.
Scholia in Lucianum 27.21 (= FDS 332A) and Cicero, Acad. ii 77, the latter of which also translates
clause (ii) of the canonical definition with three participles: ex eo quod esset sicut esset inpressum
[cf. ἐναπεσφραγισμένη] et signatum [cf. ἐναποτετυπωμένη] et effictum [cf. ἐναπομεμαγμένη]. The
third participle ἐναποτετυπωμένη – unusual in Stoic epistemological contexts and in Greek
usage more generally – I would read in line with my proposal for ἐναπεσφραγισμένη, as
indicating the active aspect in the generation of a kataleptic appearance. In support of this
suggestion, see Galen PHP ii 5.12–13, discussed by Brittain (2005, 171), which describes human
speech as ‘molded’ with concepts in the mind (ὑπὸ τῶν ἐννοιῶν ἐνσεσημασμένον τῶν ἐν τῇ
διανοίᾳ καὶ οἷον ἐκτετυπωμένον ἐκπέμπεσθαι τὸν λόγον).
28 The version of clause (ii) in DL vii 46 mentions sealing first and imprinting second (κατ᾽
αὐτὸ τὸ ὑπάρχον ἐναπεσφραγισμένην καὶ ἐναπομεμαγμένην), but this variation is of no philo-
sophical significance. The important point is that imprinting and sealing pick out the passive
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For instance, consider a case where the subject forms a perceptual kataleptic
appearance of a brown dog. On my interpretation, this entails that there really is
a brown dog in the perceiver’s surroundings, and thus that the appearance is
true (clause (i)). Additionally (clause (ii)), the perceiver’s mind must receive an
imprint from the dog, via the sense-organs, and in so doing activate the appro-
priately-matching concepts – in this case, DOG and BROWN – resulting in the
appearance that <<Here is a brown dog>>. Because of the normal conditions
under which the dog is perceived, and because the subject’s mind has activated
the correct concepts in response to this encounter, the conditions are fully
satisfied for bringing the brown dog into the subject’s awareness and for
sensorily representing it without any blemish.29
In making this proposal, I hope to explain better than the standard inter-
pretation why clause (ii) refers to the kataleptic appearance’s representational
character and causal history. We have seen that, in general, which features an
appearance depicts will depend on the concepts deployed in generating it – on
the ‘seals’ that are affixed. So then, we would expect that in creating a kataleptic
appearance the subject must call upon the right concepts, the ones that appro-
priately render the sense-object and its features. This expectation is corroborated
by the Stoic insistence that, in order to form a perceptual kataleptic appearance,
more is needed than the normal operation of the sense-organs in non-deviant
perceptual conditions: the Stoics also require the perceiver’s mind (διάνοια) to
be in working order (SE M vii 424).30 Since the Stoics characterize the mind as
unified (Iamblichus, SVF ii 826), with its stored concepts as its parts (Chrysippus
in Galen, PHP v 3.2, v 4.9), this insistence also implicates the correct use of
concepts as one element necessary for a perceptual kataleptic appearance to
arise. When the concepts the perceiver’s mind has activated correctly render the
object she has encountered, the appearance she forms enjoys the right kind of
and active aspects of the kataleptic appearance, respectively. The chronology of psychological
events need not be inferred from the order of the participles in any given formulation of clause
(ii). For versions of clause (ii) with three participles, see note above.
29 Cf. the ‘hybrid’ account of the canonical definition, combining elements of externalism and
internalism, defended recently by Nawar (2014, 16–20). See also discussion in Shogry (2018,
364–5). However, as noted above (n. 22), my view differs from Nawar’s in emphasizing the Stoic
insistence on the role of the perceiver’s mind in generating a kataleptic appearance, namely, in
activating the concepts appropriate for the object. Unlike Nawar’s reconstruction, mine includes
the condition and activity of the perceiver’s mind as an epistemologically significant element of
the causal history of the kataleptic appearance.
30 Perhaps this insistence also explains why some Stoics nominate ‘right reason’ (ὀρθὸς λόγος)
as a criterion of truth (DL vii 54). Such commitments show that it is highly misleading to
describe the Stoics as ‘staunch empiricists’ (Stojanović 2019, 158).
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link between mind and world: its representational character and causal history
stand apart from any false appearance (clause (iii)).
Of course, more should be said as to which concepts count as correct or
appropriate on my interpretation. And we might also wonder whether the
ordinary agent will in fact possess such concepts. To better understand the
dimensions of the mind-dependence of the kataleptic appearance, and also to
showcase the explanatory power of my interpretation, we should now turn to
one Stoic response to the skeptical indistinguishability argument.
Skeptical Indistinguishability and the Stoic
Appeal to Expertise
Recall that, with the ‘indistinguishability’ (ἀπαραλλαξία) argument, the skeptics
argue that, for any putatively kataleptic appearance, there is a false appearance
that differs from it in no respect (Cicero Acad. ii 40, 83; SE M vii 402 ff.). The
skeptics often formulate this claim in terms of the Stoics’ own definition of the
kataleptic appearance, conceding to them that while very many appearances meet
the first two clauses, none meets all three (SE M vii 251, 402; Cicero, Acad. ii 77).
Consequently, they deny that the Stoics have succeeded in sketching a path to
attain the epistemic security promised in κατάληψις.31
One version of the indistinguishability argument adduces cases in which the
subject perceives a pair of highly similar objects, such as eggs, twins, or snakes
(SE M vii 408–411; Cicero Acad. ii 54–57, 84–87). The challenge proceeds as
follows. Suppose there are two eggs, Egg A and Egg B, and that the first of these
is presented to the subject who then forms an appearance of Egg A. Since this
object is perceived under ordinary conditions, the subject’s appearance of Egg A
should count as kataleptic. After all, according to the Stoics, it is the norm to
generate perceptual kataleptic appearances (Cicero, Acad. i 42), and there is
nothing obviously deficient in the circumstances attending her encounter with
Egg A. Next we are to suppose that, while the subject’s back is turned, Egg A is
replaced with Egg B. Surely, the skeptics will argue, the subject’s appearance of
Egg A differs in no way from the one she now forms of Egg B, given that the
objects are so similar. But then the subject’s putatively-kataleptic appearance of
Egg A could have been caused from a state of affairs other than that in which
Egg A is present, namely, that in which Egg B is present.
31 For further discussion of this Academic argument, see Nawar (2017, 153–157), Brittain (2006,
xix-xxii), Perin (2005, 396–399), and Striker (1996, 51–57).
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The result then generalizes. The skeptics argue that any true appearance
that is ‘imprinted and sealed on the basis of what indeed is the case’ could
nevertheless have been created by an alternative, false state of affairs, and so
could have come from ‘what is not the case’ (cf. clause (iii)).
Now, given the reconstruction of the canonical definition I have offered
above, how would the Stoics hear this generalized skeptical claim? Although
many appearances are true (clause (i)), and have been imprinted on the mind
from a perceptual encounter with an object, sealed with the appropriate con-
cepts (clause (ii)), all such appearances could have been created by some state
of affairs other than that which they represent, and thus fail clause (iii). For this
reason, appearances which meet (i) and (ii) still have the potential to mislead.
Indeed, some details in Sextus’s presentation suggest that the skeptics
formulate the challenge from highly similar objects so as to target the Stoic
commitment to the mind’s activity in generating a kataleptic appearance.
Consider how the conclusion of the challenge is described at SE M vii 408.
Since it is possible for a subject to form indistinguishable appearances of a pair
of eggs in certain circumstances, Sextus claims that the skeptics successfully
demonstrate that kataleptic and non-kataleptic appearances are indistinguish-
able ‘in their impress and outline’ (κατὰ χαρακτῆρα καὶ… κατὰ τύπον).32 Sextus’s
imagery here is clearly of a piece with the two participles in clause (ii), since
‘impress’, ‘outline’, ‘imprint’, and ‘seal’ are all elements of wax inscription (cf.
DL vii 50). Now, one might be tempted to take ‘impress’ and ‘outline’ at M vii
408 as both referring to a passive process – i. e. to the way in which the mind
has been affected by a sense-object – and so analogously with ‘imprinted’ on my
construal of clause (ii). But if this is right, then Sextus would be assuming that
correct concept application forms no part of the Stoic view he intends to refute
with the challenge from highly similar objects. However, on purely linguistic
grounds, it is more plausible to understand the ‘impress’ (χαρακτήρ) mentioned
at M vii 408 as a synonym for ‘sealed’, in that the impress, like a seal, is the item
affixed or attached to an underlying receptive surface. On this reading, the
‘impress’ of a kataleptic appearance refers to its active aspect, i. e. to the
concepts the mind calls upon to generate it.33 So understood, the passage
32 SE M vii 408: ἀλλὰ γὰρ αὕτη μὲν ἡ ἀπαραλλαξία τῶν τε καταληπτικῶν
καὶ τῶν ἀκαταλήπτων φαντασιῶν κατὰ τὸ ἐναργὲς καὶ ἔντονον ἰδίωμα παρίσταται. οὐδὲν
δὲ ἧττον δείκνυται τοῖς ἀπὸ τῆς Ἀκαδημίας καὶ ἡ κατὰ χαρακτῆρα καὶ ἡ κατὰ τύπον.
33 A χαρακτήρ can mean either the engraver himself (LSJ s.v. χαρακτήρ A.I) or the item
engraved upon a surface (LSJ s.v. χαρακτήρ A.II). Both meanings are consistent with the
χαρακτήρ of an appearance being used by the Stoics to refer to the concepts that have been
activated in the course of its generation. Admittedly, there is some indeterminacy in Sextus’s
use of these metaphors, e. g. at M vii 251, where a χαρακτήρ is what is left by the ‘the seals on
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lends support to the reconstruction sketched above, on which the skeptical
challenge is designed to show that a putatively kataleptic appearance is indis-
tinguishable from one that is not, in part because the two appearances have
activated the same concepts in response to highly similar objects.34
So how do the Stoics meet this challenge? As they see things, there is no
reason to concede to the skeptics that amateur perceivers possess the appropri-
ate concepts to distinguish one egg from another: the skeptical challenge thus
fails to attend to the cognitive and perceptual transformation wrought by exper-
tise. The Stoics will claim that, in encountering Egg A, the amateur mind
activates concepts that do not differentiate this object from Egg B: for both
members of the pair, the amateur’s concepts are no more determinate than
WHITE and EGG. But this means that the amateur appearance created from an
encounter with Egg A is not sealed on the basis of Egg A itself (κατ’ αὐτὸ τὸ
ὑπάρχον… ἐναπεσφραγισμένη) and for this reason is not kataleptic, as it fails to
meet clause (ii). Therefore, from the Stoic perspective, rather than offering a
decisive refutation, at the general level, of the reliability of the kataleptic
appearance, the skeptical challenge from highly similar objects only establishes
the much narrower and philosophically innocuous claim that, for some speci-
alized objects, in some scenarios, a kataleptic appearance will not be available
for an amateur perceiver.
When it comes to the expert, by contrast, the Stoics will say that she has
developed her mind to such an extent that she can generate appearances which
succeed in distinguishing the minute differences between Egg A and Egg B.35
rings’ (αἱ διὰ τῶν δακτυλίων σφραγῖδες). But even here the context allows us to interpret ‘seals’
(σφραγῖδες) as the stored mental items applied by the subject of the kataleptic appearance, in
order to articulate what is delivered to her mind by the sense-organs. This is because in the
same passage the subject of the kataleptic appearance is compared to a carver who has ‘set
their hands to all parts of the works they are completing’ (SE M vii 251). Across its various
formulations, then, the skeptical challenge presupposes the claim that forming a kataleptic
appearance is an activity that engages the perceiver’s mind and concepts. But Sextus is less
precise than we might wish in the metaphors he uses to refer to this activity.
34 So construed, this skeptical challenge bears some resemblance to Socrates’s criticism in the
Theaetetus of one version of the proposal that ἐπιστήμη is true δόξα with an account (209a1–
c10). Here Socrates highlights the difficulty in formulating an account that succeeds in distin-
guishing highly similar individuals (e. g. two human beings) on the basis of general features
that they share (e. g. having a snubbed nose and prominent eyes).
35 Earlier, at Acad. ii 20, Lucullus maintains that, on the basis of their training and expertise
(exercitatione et arte), musicians and painters receive more detailed appearances of music and
painting than do amateur perceivers. I take it that the same point is assumed here, in Lucullus’s
response to indistinguishability (Acad. ii 54–58; cf. ii 85–87). In fact, the Stoic distinction
between expert and non-expert appearances is attested in several sources. DL vii 51 contrasts
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This is because, unlike the amateur’s appearances, those of the expert deploy
the appropriate concepts and so meet clause (ii). The appropriateness of these
concepts consists in their ability to distinguish the object from others in the
perceptual scene: in the case of the expert, the seals affixed to Egg A differ from
those affixed to Egg B. Or so I will now suggest.
Consider the passage in Cicero’s Academica where the character Lucullus
responds to this brand of skeptical challenge (ii 54–58).36 He begins with a well-
attested thesis of Stoic metaphysics, that no two numerically distinct objects are
qualitatively identical (cf. Cicero Acad. ii 85; Plutarch Com. Not. 1077c–e).37
Lucullus next proposes that, for those who have attained expertise in the
relevant domain, it is possible to distinguish one discrete object in that domain
from another, even when they are highly similar, in virtue of the appearances
the expert forms of such objects. He then illustrates this proposal as follows:
You see how the similarity of eggs to each other is proverbial? Nevertheless, we have heard
that there were quite a few people on Delos, when things were going well for them there,
who used to rear a great number of hens for their living. Well, when these men had
inspected an egg, they could usually tell which hen had laid it. Nor does this work against
us, since it is all right for us not to be able to discriminate those eggs: that doesn’t make it
any more reasonable to assent that this egg is that one, as if there were absolutely no
difference between them (Cicero Acad. ii 57–58, tr. Brittain).38
On the basis of their training, the expert can form perceptual appearances
capturing the difference between two discrete – but highly similar – objects
within their domain of expertise.
Why might the Stoics take this view? One relevant fact will be that the
Delian farmer, insofar as he is an expert in the domain of eggs, has a richer
τεχνική and ἄτεχνος φαντασία as follows: ‘a picture is seen in one way by an expert and in any
way by an amateur’. Note also the distinction drawn by the early Stoic Diogenes of Babylon
between ‘natural’ and ‘knowing’ perception (αὐτοφυής and ἐπιστημονική αἴσθησις) in
Philodemus, On Music iv 34.1–8. And Epictetus, Diss. iii 6.8 remarks on the capacity of the
musical expert to hear notes that the amateur cannot (§6).
36 For a defense of the use of Cicero’s character Lucullus as a source for Stoic epistemology,
despite his professed affiliation with Antiochus of Aschalon (Acad. ii 10), see Striker (1997, 258)
and Perin (2005, 387).
37 For discussion of this metaphysical thesis and its broader philosophical motivations, see
Sedley (2018, 28–34), Nawar (2017, 120–123), and Sedley (1982, 259–265).
38 Cicero, Acad. ii 57–58: videsne ut in proverbio sit ovorum inter se similitudo: tamen hoc
accepimus, Deli fuisse complures salvis rebus illis, qui gallinas alere permultas quaestus causa
solerent; ii cum ovum inspexerant quae id gallina peperisset dicere solebant. Neque id est contra
nos; nam nobis satis esset ova illa non internoscere; nihil enim magis adsentiri hoc illud esse
quam si inter illa omnino nihil interesset.
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conceptual apparatus which his mind can rely on to generate perceptual appear-
ances of eggs. His training has furnished him with domain-specific concepts
(e. g. FRECKLED) that succeed in making salient the genuine differences between
Eggs A and B. Or he may re-arrange more basic concepts in a specialized pattern
(e. g. applying OBLONG to Egg A but not B).
By contrast, the amateur’s appearances do not reveal such distinctions,
because the amateur lacks the expert’s specialized conceptual resources. So
although the expert and amateur are ‘imprinted’ by the same sense-objects –
Egg A and Egg B – their minds respond to these objects differently, by activating
different sets of ‘seals’ (concepts), and so form appearances differing in their
degree of discriminatory power. Fully spelled out, then, the Stoic appeal to
expertise consists in the claim that since there is a metaphysical difference
between any two numerically distinct objects, it is possible to perceptually
detect this difference, provided that one has the relevant expertise and the
robust set of conceptual resources that comes with it.
It is crucial to consider exactly what kind of expertise the Stoics have in mind
here. Recall that, in the cases used to illustrate the Stoic appeal to expertise, our
sources give no indication that the expert perceiver has acquired the total state of
wisdom characteristic of the Sage.39 We can infer, then, that the kind of expertise
the Stoics are calling attention to here – the cognitive accomplishment that
enables the Delian farmer to perceptually discriminate two highly similar eggs –
is a condition that is in principle available to the vast majority of rational
creatures who fall short of the Stoics’ extremely demanding requirements for
virtue.40 The amplification of one’s conceptual resources is a perfect candidate
for such an accomplishment. With the right kind of instruction and experience in
a given domain, any rational perceiver can expand their conceptual repertoire,
39 Pace Brittain (2006, xii) and Annas (1990, 199). Note that the Stoic definition of τέχνη does
not require the possession of ἐπιστήμη (Galen, SVF ii 93; SE M xi 182), and so will be open to
vicious and virtuous agents alike. See also Simplicius In Cat. viii 237.25–238.2, where the Stoics
are reported to deny that τέχνη is a διάθεσις like virtue or vice (cf. DL vii 89; Arius in Stob. Ecl. ii
70.21–71.14). For further discussion of the definition of τέχνη, see Menn (1995, 9–11).
40 It is not plausible to suppose that either the Delian farmer or the mother identifying her twin
sons has acquired the virtue of non-precipitancy, or the global ‘knowledge of when to give
assent and when not’ that the Sage possesses (DL vii 46). This is a much more demanding
accomplishment, which the Stoics also refer to as an expertise in living (Arius in Stob. Ecl. ii
66.19–67.2). See discussion in Vogt (2008, 118–130). The Stoics presume, then, that the Sage
possesses a different, stronger form of expertise than the one featuring in their response to the
challenge from highly similar objects.
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with the result that their perceptual appearances track the minute differences
between highly similar objects.41
Of course, to appreciate these points, it is necessary to acknowledge the role
of correct concept application – and more generally the activity of the per-
ceiver’s mind – in the formation of a kataleptic appearance. But this will require
an augmentation to the standard interpretation, along the lines I proposed
above.
Consider again the standard interpretation, which accords no activity to the
subject’s mind in the course of generating a kataleptic appearance: clause (ii) on
this view expresses only that the mind takes on a particularly accurate imprint
from the object. Admittedly this view has the resources to distinguish the
physical constitution of the expert and amateur minds, and on this basis their
receptive potential (cf. Galen, PHP iv 6.1–12). The tension of the πνεῦμα con-
stituting the expert mind could be more apt to receive a detailed imprint of the
sense-object than that of the amateur mind. But unless the appearance is
conceived of as a psychological activity sensitive to differences in judgment
and other ‘rational’ achievements, the difference in the underlying πνεῦμα of the
expert and amateur minds would be unmotivated: it would fail to track any
functional difference in the minds of these two subjects as they form their
appearances. Here we should recall the Stoic insistence that the appearance
transpires in the subject’s mind rather than in her sense-organs (SE M vii 232–
233), and also their well-attested claim that it is not merely the beliefs of the
expert and amateur that differ, but the character of their appearances as well
(Cicero, Acad. ii 20; DL vii 51).42 Taking these points on board, my proposal to
amplify the standard interpretation insists that imprinting alone cannot tell the
whole story as to the differential ability of expert and amateur appearances to
reach out and ‘grasp’ the world. What the expert has accomplished and the
41 At Acad. ii 57, Cicero’s Lucullus adduces the case of a mother drawing on habit or custom
(consuetudo) to perceptually discriminate her twin sons. Does this remark undermine the
interpretation I have been offering? No, because we can understand this habit or custom to
involve some conceptual amplification on the mother’s part – e. g. applying IRASCIBLE or
STUBBORN to one of her twins but not the other – which falls short of genuine wisdom.
42 See Vogt (2016, 148), for insightful discussion of why the Epicureans locate sense-perception
in the sense-organs rather than in the mind. In part, it is to uphold their claim that sense-
perception is ἄλογος, which in turn supports their thesis that all sense-perception is true (DL x
31–32). The contrast with the Stoic account of λογική φαντασία couldn’t be sharper: here the
Stoics deny that all our appearances are on a par with respect to truth and representational
detail, because they hold that the mind is implicated in their generation. So then, without the
claim that the appearance transpires in the subject’s mind, and so is formed on the basis of
some mental activity, the Stoics could not defend their distinction between expert and non-
expert appearances (DL vii 51) and their view would collapse to that of the Epicureans.
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amateur has not is something active and intellectual, a discernment in judgment
sharpening the appearances she creates.
Does κατάληψις Require Expertise?
Reflection on the Stoic response to the indistinguishability argument has
brought to light their claim that, in order to form a kataleptic appearance,
the perceiver must have a mind stocked with concepts that distinguish the
object from others in the perceptual scene. Having activated such concepts, the
kataleptic appearance is ‘sealed… on the basis of what indeed is the case’
(clause (ii)): the concepts match the object and succeed in differentiating it
from others in the relevant scenario. This reconstruction explains why the
Stoics describe kataleptic appearances as those that ‘discern expertly
(τεχνικῶς) the difference present in their objects’ (SE M vii 252).43 And, more
generally, it takes seriously the Stoic commitment to the mind’s role in the
generation of every perceptual kataleptic appearance (SE M vii 424) – a
commitment the Stoics have strong philosophical reasons to uphold, insofar
as they (1) deny that perceptual representation transpires in the absence of the
activation of subject’s concepts, and (2) characterize the subject’s concepts as
the parts of her rational mind (Chrysippus in Galen, PHP v 3.2, v 4.9). So then,
because the expert surpasses the amateur in the scale of her conceptual
resources, she has effectively broadened the circumstances in which a kata-
leptic appearance is available to her.
But how far do the Stoics take this response? Do they hold that expertise of
the relevant kind is necessary to form any perceptual kataleptic appearance, since
only experts possess a mind furnished with the correct concepts? If so, then it
43 In an earlier passage discussing clause (ii) of the canonical definition (M vii 250), Sextus
reports that the Stoics include the participles ‘imprinted’ and ‘sealed’ to indicate that, in a
kataleptic appearance, ‘all the sense-objects’ characteristics are represented expertly’
(πάντα τεχνικῶς τὰ ἰδιώματα τῶν φανταστῶν ἀναμάττηται). Here I read φανταστῶν with
Mutschmann (1914). My translation assumes that ἀναμάττεσθαι functions differently than ἐν-
απομάττεσθαι (the root of the ‘imprinted’ participle in clause (ii)): to say that the features of
sense-objects ἀναμάττηται in a kataleptic appearance is to refer to the fact that a kataleptic
appearance depicts or represents sense-objects as possessing certain features. On this under-
standing, the passage evinces the Stoic commitment I have been emphasizing throughout, that
the passive and active aspects of the kataleptic appearance jointly contribute to its high quality
representational character. For discussion of the difficulties concerned with translating
ἰδιώματα in this passage, and with its claim that a kataleptic appearance must represent all
such ἰδιώματα, see Frede (1999, 307–308), and Nawar (2017, 130–132).
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would be impossible for them to defend their claim that it is the norm to achieve
perceptual κατάληψις, since the Stoics deny that it is the norm to possess
expertise across many domains in the way that Delian farmers have of eggs.
Fortunately, the Stoics can avoid this problematic consequence. Suppose
that Bill has never paid much attention to classical music, much less studied it
formally, but has been persuaded by his friend Jill, an accomplished baroque
harpsichordist, to attend a performance of Bach. They are seated in the front row
and enjoy the concert in ideal auditory conditions. If the reconstruction given
above is correct, then Jill will form kataleptic appearances that Bill does not,
e. g. <<This melodic counterpoint ends in perfect consonance>>, since she pos-
sesses a refined repertoire of musical concepts obtained through years of train-
ing. But though Bill is not a musical expert like Jill, the Stoics can hold that it is
still possible for him to form some kataleptic appearances in this scenario, e. g.
<<Music is coming from the stage>> or <<The performers are playing as a
group>>. This is because his stock of concepts, while impoverished compared
to Jill’s, is advanced enough to contain such notions as MUSIC and PERFORMER,
which the Stoics would classify as members of Bill’s set of ‘primary notions’ –
the concepts he has acquired naturally in the course of his development into
adulthood.44 Consequently, Bill can draw on this basic ‘system’ (κατάστασις) of
primary notions to accurately recognize features of the perceptual scene before
him.45 By activating MUSIC or PERFORMER, Bill could form an appearance which
correctly distinguishes what is happening on the stage from other objects in the
scenario (e. g. the chair he is sitting on or the audience surrounding him). In
such a case, then, there are a variety of kataleptic appearances the amateur
perceiver can generate. Bill’s ignorance of one domain does not obviously rule
out the possibility of κατάληψις of non-specialized features in his surroundings.
Concerning these non-specialized features, the Stoics could maintain that,
thanks to his set of primary notions, Bill is sufficiently expert.46
Wax Tablet Imagery in Plato’s Theaetetus
If the interpretation I have proposed is along the right lines, then the wax tablet
imagery in the canonical definition of the kataleptic appearance brings out both
44 See n. 10 above.
45 For the claim that the set of primary notions constitutes a ‘system’ and is classified by the
Stoics as a ‘common intellect’ (κοινὸς νοῦς), see Epictetus, Diss. iii 6.8 and discussion in Shogry
(2019, 41–2).
46 I owe this formulation to an anonymous referee.
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the passive and active aspects in the creation of such appearances: passive
‘imprinting’, whereby an object affects the perceiver, and active ‘sealing’,
whereby the appropriate concepts are activated and applied. But is there any
precedent for using wax tablet language in this way, in a philosophical context
that the Stoics would have recognized as authoritative, or at least worthy of
serious consideration?
I think the answer is yes, in the wax tablet model of soul (henceforth, the
WTM) found in Plato’s Theaetetus (191b10–195b8).47 Here I will argue that
Socrates offers an ancestor of the Stoic distinction between passive imprinting
and active sealing and deploys it to explain the possibility of false judgment
(δόξα). Though Socrates argues it ultimately fails in this task (195b9–196c8), the
model clearly exerts a strong influence on the formulation of Stoic doctrine.48
More specifically, the Stoics will have taken interest in the WTM’s commitment
to the soul’s activation of an item stored in memory to articulate a change made
by an external sense-object. The Stoics would have found no awkwardness,
then, in the use of wax tablet imagery to refer to the activity of the mind in
the creation of our cognitive and perceptual states. And they will have been
attracted to Socrates’s proposal that error is impossible when a stored mental
‘seal’ (σφραγίς) is matched correctly with perceptual stimulus.
To flesh out these connections, we should start with Socrates’s account of
‘seals’ (σφραγῖδες) and their origin in activities of perception and thought.49 On
47 Line numbers are those of Duke et al. (1995), not Burnet (1900).
48 See DL vii 45, Anonymous Commentary on Plato’s Theaetetus XI, and the insightful remark in
A.G. Long (2013, 5), discussing the Stoic reaction to the WTM: ‘if Plato rejected a credible theory,
then (the Stoics would say) that is Plato’s loss, not theirs: Plato’s decision need not debar a
revival of the theory’. As mentioned above, A.A. Long (2002) and Ioppolo (1990) are the
pioneering studies on the influence of the Theaetetus on the development of the kataleptic
appearance. However, Long explicitly disclaims the interpretation I believe is correct, since he
denies that the WTM contains the seeds of the Stoic claim that, in generating a kataleptic
appearance, the mind applies the concepts appropriate for the object (2002, 228). This claim
also does not feature in the reconstructions of Ioppolo (1990, 438–439) and Togni (2013, 168–
171). In what follows, I hope to supplement Long’s excellent observations (2002: 230–231) about
the role of Theaetetus 208c–209d in shaping the Stoic claim that the kataleptic appearance
distinguishes its object from others in the perceptual scene (SE M vii 252, discussed above).
49 Besides ‘seal’ (σφραγίς, 192a6), Socrates uses a variety of terms that are interchangeable in
the context of the WTM: ‘outline’ (τύπος, 192a4; 194b6), ‘sign’ (σημεῖον, 192b3, b4; 193c1, c3, c7;
194a2, a7, d1, d4), ‘image’ (εἴδωλον, 191d10), ‘imprint’ (ἐκμαγεῖον, 194d6, e6), and ‘memory-
imprint’ (μνημεῖον, 192a2, b6). Despite the subtle differences in sense, these terms must all refer
to the same psychological entity posited in the WTM: a representation of x stored in memory,
created by an act of perception or thought, which enables future recognition of x. Here I follow
Rowett (2012, 161), Woolf (2004, 588), and Crivelli (2003, 192).
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the view Socrates presents, which focuses on the case of perception (cf. 195d1–2),
the sense-object makes contact with the sense-organ, and then affects the soul in
such a way as to leave a seal on it, just like a signet ring, when pressed upon wax,
leaves behind an image of the signet (191c8–e1). Moreover, just as wax retains
these images over time, the soul is said to store in memory, for later use, the seal
left behind in this episode of perceptual contact.
Socrates’s next task is to explain how we come to mistaken judgments about
the objects for which we have such seals.50 The key move here is to distinguish
between possessing (ἔχειν: 193b10) a seal and attaching it to (προσαρμόσαι:
193c4, 194a8) an occurrent object of perception (193b9–d4).51 According to the
general view that emerges (194b2–6), false judgment is possible in the case
where the perceiver has a seal of x but fails to affix it to the correct perceptual
input, i. e. to the input created from an actual encounter with x: for instance,
upon seeing Theaetetus, one attaches the ‘Theodorus’ seal to the perceptual
stimulus, resulting in the false judgment that ‘here is Theodorus’. Conversely, it
will be impossible for a perceiver to generate a false judgment in the case where
the seal and perceptual input are matched correctly.52 According to the account
of epistemological success presented in the WTM, then, the good case is one
where the perceptual input is categorized according to the correct seal – where
‘recognition’ (ἀναγνώρισις) of the object is said to occur (193c5). Socrates prefers
to express this view in modal terms: it is impossible, he claims, to create a false
judgment when the perceiver correctly matches an object with its appropriate
seal (192b3–5). We can thus summarize Socrates’s proposal in the WTM as
follows:
(Attach-WTM): judgment requires the soul to attach a seal to perceptual input.
(Match-WTM): false judgment is impossible in the case where the perceiver correctly
matches seal and perceptual input.
Socrates is not entirely clear in the WTM as to what accounts for the bad cases,
those in which (Match-WTM) is not satisfied. He does indicate that, when the
50 Socrates has already identified knowing x with possessing an image of x (191d9–e1). In
attempting to show how error is possible regarding the objects which we know, Socrates
responds to the earlier argument, from knowing and not-knowing, against the possibility of
false judgment (187e5–188c8; cf. 191a8–b1). See Crivelli (2003, 175–176).
51 Becker (2006, 306) correctly describes this attaching as an ‘Aktivität der Seele’.
52 Of course, there will be other circumstances besides correctly matching seal and sense-
object in which no false perceptual judgment can be created. Indeed, Socrates takes some care
in elaborating all such cases (192a–c6). However, examining them here would take us too far
afield. See Crivelli (2003, 181–185), Burnyeat (1990, 97), and McDowell (1973, 210–211).
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object is encountered under non-ideal perceptual circumstances, such as bad
lighting or long distance in the case of vision, a correct application will be more
difficult (193c1–2). However, in addition to these factors external to the per-
ceiver, Socrates also explains how the internal character of the soul will be
relevant, specifically whether its constituent wax is pure, clean, and of the
proper consistency (194c5–7). The purest souls are found in the wise, who
succeed in distributing their seals to the correct sense-objects and so avoid
forming false judgments (194d5–7). This contrasts, of course, with souls that
are dirty, runny, small or excessively hard – conditions that are said to impede
correct matching (194e1–195a9).53
On my reconstruction, the Stoics are deeply indebted to this model, defend-
ing a modified version of it as follows:
(Attach-Stoics): appearance requires the mind to attach concepts to perceptual input.
(Match-Stoics): false appearance is impossible in the case where the mind correctly
matches concepts with perceptual input, i. e. when it attaches the concepts appropriate
for the perceptual input.
Hewing closely to the imagery of the WTM, the Stoics in several texts speak of
concepts as inscriptions. For instance, in one passage, the Stoics compare the
human soul to a blank sheet of paper on which ‘each one of our concepts is
inscribed’.54 Similarly, just after he considers the content of the concept HUMAN,
Cicero’s Lucullus speaks of concepts, in general, as items which are ‘engraved’
(inprimuntur) in the soul and stored in memory (Acad. ii 21–22).55 It is these
53 Socrates may be suggesting that it is the degraded character of the seals themselves that
accounts for a mismatch: when stored in souls of improper consistency, seals suffer degradation
over time and become ‘unclear’ (ἀσαφῆ) and ‘obscure’ (ἀμυδρά) (194e5–195a2), therefore
hindering their proper application. However, there is no reason to think that this explanation
will generalize to every case of mismatch. For instance, in his discussion of non-ideal external
conditions, Socrates leaves open the possibility that, despite having an uncompromised seal,
what reaches the soul through the sense-organs (194c7: τὰ ἰόντα διὰ τῶν αἰσθήσεων) does not
enable the correct application of that imprint. Thanks to the distance of the object, these
perceptual encounters are too indeterminate to allow the subject to form a true judgment,
even if her soul possesses an unblemished seal of the relevant sense-object. Here my recon-
struction follows that of Crivelli (2003, 193–194). See Woolf (2004, 589–590) for criticism of the
claim that the degradation of a seal explains cases of mismatch.
54 Aëtius iv 11.1–4 = SVF ii 83: ὅταν γεννηθῇ ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ἔχει τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν μέρος τῆς ψυχῆς
ὥσπερ χάρτην εὔεργον εἰς ἀπογραφήν· εἰς τοῦτο μίαν ἑκάστην τῶν ἐννοιῶν ἐναπογράφεται. Cf.
Ps.-Galen, Medical Definitions xix 381: ‘A concept is a stored thought, and a thought is a rational
appearance’. See Crivelli (2010, 374–375).
55 Cf. Cicero, Topica xxvii: ‘of these things [sc. that are intangible, e. g. ownership and
acquisition]… there is a certain pattern sealed and impressed in the intellect’ (quaedam
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stored representational entities which, according to the Stoics, following
Socrates in the WTM, the mind activates to articulate the incoming deliverances
of the sense-organs, resulting in a ‘thought’ (νόησις), i. e. a rational appearance
(cf. DL vii 51).
It should be conceded, of course, that for the Stoics these stored entities
(concepts) are explicitly of a generic or universal character, while in the WTM,
Socrates focuses instead on representations of particulars (e. g. the seals left by
Theaetetus and Theodorus).56 And Socrates nowhere in the WTM envisions the
possibility of the soul attaching multiple seals to perceptual input, whereas each
Stoic rational appearance seems to activate more than a single concept (e. g.
BROWN and DOG in the appearance of the brown dog). However, in sketching a
role for the mind to play in making significant the deliverances of the senses, by
means of attaching a representational entity stored in memory, Socrates offers
the Stoics a promising psychological model for the activity involved in generat-
ing each appearance.57
Furthermore, when these entities are matched correctly – when the appro-
priate concepts are activated to articulate the character of the perceptual stimulus
– the Stoics agree that error is impossible: the appearances formed in such
circumstances ‘are of such a sort that they could not have come from what is
not the case’ (clause (iii)). There is some reason to think, then, that the modal
conformatio insignita et impressa intellegentia), which I call ‘concept’ (notionem voco).’ While
this report is not explicitly attributed to the Stoics, I agree with Crivelli (2010, 384–386) that it
gives evidence of a Stoic view. Cf. also Seneca De Clementia i 3.1: ‘since there are vices which
imitate the virtues, they cannot be discerned unless you impress them with seals by which they
are distinguished’ (nam cum sint vitia quaedam virtutes imitantia, non possunt secerni, nisi signa,
quibus dinoscantur, impresseris).
56 But cf. the later reference to the WTM at Theaetetus 209c5–10 and discussion in Long (2002,
230–231). Here Socrates speaks of Theaetetus’s snubness as distinct from other kinds of snub-
ness, and claims that ‘‘once impressed it is established” (ἐνσημηναμένη κατάθηται, 209c8) in
the soul. This seems to anticipate the Stoic claim that certain seals (concepts) can be more
detailed or fine-grained than others. Cf. Galen, PHP ii 5.12–13, quoted above in n. 27.
57 The WTM is committed, after all, to the view that to form a true or false thought involves
more than a change in the sense-organs. Recall Socrates’s claim that until ‘what comes through
the sense-organs’ (194c6: τὰ ἰόντα διὰ τῶν αἰσθήσεων) receives the application of some seal or
another, no truth-evaluable δόξα is formed. Here Socrates is likely presupposing the character-
ization of perception from the final refutation of knowledge as perception, on which perception
does not access being and so cannot get at truth (186c7–10). This further cognitive accomplish-
ment requires a distinct activity of the soul on its own. Pace Ioppolo (1990, 439–441) and Caston
(forthcoming, 22), I think that the Stoics take this point on board in their account of the rational
appearance. Cf. SE M vii 344–5 and discussion in Shogry 2019, 59–60. For helpful observations
concerning the connections in the Theaetetus between the WTM and the final refutation of
knowledge as perception, see Sedley (2004, 136).
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force of the WTM’s account of epistemological success is reflected in the Stoic
definition of the kataleptic appearance.58 And we can find an early expression of
the Stoic appeal to expertise in Socrates’s claim that the souls of the wise enjoy
more success than the ignorant in matching perceptual inputs with their correct
seals (194d4–6). Like Socrates in the WTM, the Stoics maintain that experts and
amateur minds differ in their corporeal make-up, and that this difference affects
which seals (concepts) each applies.59
In fact, this WTM-inspired account is developed in some detail in the
writings of the later Stoic Epictetus, who praises correct concept application as
characteristic of virtue.60 Consider one of Epictetus’s protreptic conversations
with his students (Diss. ii 11), where he observes that, despite the fact that every
human possesses the concepts GOOD and BAD, BEAUTIFUL and UGLY, we still
often fail to ‘attach’ (ἐφαρμόζειν) them to the particular objects falling under
them.
The explanation for this [natural inclination to use GOOD, BAD, BEAUTIFUL, UGLY] is that
humans already arrive in this place having been instructed, as it were, by nature, but while
starting from here we have added on our own defective thinking. – Yes, by Zeus, he says, for
do I not know the beautiful and the ugly? Do I not have a concept of this? – Yes, you do – Do
I not attach them to particulars? – You do attach them. – Do I then not attach them well? –
Here is the entire question and here is where our defective thinking comes in. For although
58 We might wonder why the Stoic account pertains to appearance (φαντασία) and not δόξα as
in the WTM. I think that this shift stems from the Stoic conception of δόξα as an inherently
defective cognitive state (Arius in Stob., SVF iii 548). See Vogt (2012, 158–166) and Meinwald
(2005) for detailed discussion. In the Stoic context, then, it is φαντασία not δόξα that admits of
the kind of epistemological improvement which the WTM seeks to explain: the Stoics regard
appearance as the state which under certain circumstances cannot be false. We should also note
that the inherently defective status of δόξα motivates Socrates’s later rationale at 200d–201c for
rejecting any proposal identifying ἐπιστήμη with true δόξα.
59 However, the Stoics can be seen to depart from the WTM in their focus on forms of expertise
available to the non-wise agent. As I argued above (§5–6), the Stoics think that attaining
expertise in the manner of the Delian farmer is a less demanding accomplishment than
becoming virtuous and wise. And so, given Stoic principles, the corporeal make-up of such
an expert soul should differ not only from the non-expert’s but also from that of the Sage: an
expert like the Delian farmer has not brought about the change in the overall condition of his
soul that is virtue (cf. DL vii 89). Socrates in the WTM, however, simply contrasts wise and non-
wise souls and assumes that they differ in their overall physical condition (194c5–195a9). I
thank an anonymous referee for drawing this point to my attention.
60 Furthermore, we know that Chrysippus identifies the symmetry of concepts (the parts of
reason) with psychological health, and thus with virtue (PHP v 2.49, v 3.1–2, v 4.9; cf. Cicero,
Tusc. Disc. iv 78). Perhaps this symmetry consists in applying concepts to their proper objects.
For discussion of successful and unsuccessful concept application in the context of the early
Stoic theory of definition, see Crivelli (2010, 387–390).
The Stoic Appeal to Expertise 27
Brought to you by | University of Oxford - Bodleian Libraries
Authenticated
Download Date | 8/29/19 1:50 PM
humans begin from these agreed-upon concepts, they proceed to disagree with one another
because of incongruous application of them. Because indeed if they acquired in addition to
the concepts the applications as well, what would prevent them from being perfect?
(Epictetus, Discourses ii 11.6–10, tr. Oldfather modified)61
In this revealing passage, Epictetus draws a distinction between possessing con-
cepts (ἔχειν ἐννοίας) and attaching them to particular objects (ἐφαρμόζειν τοῖς ἐπὶ
μέρους) to explain the origin of persistent disagreement about value and to sketch
a vision of epistemological perfection. Note first his remark that we ‘already arrive
in this place having been instructed, as it were, by nature’. This surely reflects the
Stoic claim that we rational creatures have acquired these concepts (more specif-
ically, the primary notions or προλήψεις of GOOD and BAD, BEAUTIFUL and UGLY)
as a result of our natural development into adulthood (DL vii 53).
Note further that in this passage and elsewhere in the Discourses (e. g. i 22.1–
9), Epictetus uses Socrates’s metaphor of ‘attaching’ (ἐφαρμόζειν) to describe the
(mis-)predication of concepts to object. His claim is that while we all possess the
concept GOOD, we often err by attaching this concept to items – such as wealth,
political power, health, etc. – that are not good, on Stoic theory, but instead are
merely preferred. We thus suffer from ‘defective thinking’ (οἴησις).62 And dis-
agreement arises because our patterns of mis-application differ: some of us
mistake wealth for a good, others political power, etc. (Diss. iv 1.41–46). But
for those who apply concepts correctly, and thus regularly form thoughts about
the world that match objects with their appropriate mental classifications, ‘what
could prevent them from being perfect’?
Conclusion
If the interpretation I have offered here is along the right lines, then Epictetus’s
vision of epistemological perfection is reflected in the Stoic account of the
61 Diss ii 11.6–10, reading the text of Schenkl (1916): τούτου δ’ αἴτιον τὸ ἥκειν ἤδη τινὰ ὑπὸ τῆς
φύσεως κατὰ τὸν τόπον ὥσπερ δεδιδαγμένους, ἀφ’ ὧν ὁρμώμενοι καὶ τὴν οἴησιν προσειλήφαμεν. —
Διὰ γάρ, φησίν, οὐκ οἶδα ἐγὼ τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ αἰσχρόν; οὐκ ἔχω ἔννοιαν αὐτοῦ; — Ἔχεις. — Οὐκ
ἐφαρμόζω τοῖς ἐπὶ μέρους; — Ἐφαρμόζεις. — Οὐ καλῶς οὖν ἐφαρμόζω; — Ἐνταῦθά ἐστι τὸ ζήτημα
πᾶν καὶ οἴησις ἐνταῦθα προσγίνεται. ἀφ’ ὁμολογουμένων γὰρ ὁρμώμενοι τούτων ἐπὶ τὸ
ἀμφισβητούμενον προάγουσιν ὑπὸ τῆς ἀκαταλλήλου ἐφαρμογῆς. ὡς εἴ γε καὶ τοῦτο ἔτι πρὸς
ἐκείνοις ἐκέκτηντο, τί ἐκώλυεν αὐτοὺς εἶναι τελείους;
62 It is likely that here Epictetus is referring to defective rational appearances, which may or
may not go on to receive the subject’s assent. DL vii 23 records a similarly pejorative use οἴησις
in Stoic epistemology but the context does not make clear whether assent is involved.
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kataleptic appearance. That is because in defining such as appearances as
‘sealed… on the basis of what indeed is the case’, the Stoics hold that they are
generated on the basis of the concepts appropriate for the object, those which
match that object and succeed in distinguishing it from others in the scenario. I
propose that it is rumination on Plato’s Theaetetus – specifically, on Socrates’s
description in the WTM of the soul’s activity of attaching seals to perceptual
input – that leads the Stoics to adopt this claim and to develop it into a subtle
and intriguing response to skeptical indistinguishability.63
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